Authors
- Altabaeva Elena Doctor of Philology, Professor
Annotation
The main objective of this paper is to analyze logical nature of desire situation to reveal the forms of thought, related to this situation, and its conceptual specific character. The appropriate concept from a logical standpoint is considered as conceptual and logical base of the category of optation.
In the course of the research, we discovered that sentences with semantics of desire cannot be solely qualified by modal logic according to the type of assessment due to the originality of the concept, which we are researching, and the modal semantics of the same name. Epistemic modality is most close to optation when determined by the following factors of non-logical order, which are not always acknowledged or controlled by the subject: habits, inclinations, and preferences. We cannot deny a certain connection between desire and ability, necessity and, especially, incentive. The commonality of logical (notional) part of the appropriate concept and content of assessments, different in ontological sense, may be explained from positions of semantics of the «possible worlds» and can be determined by the relationships between the sphere of the speaker’s desire and objective reality, between the “Me- world” and the “non – Me world” (we imply the individual’s reaction to different things, phenomena or events (both real and virtual) in the form of their comparison, their positive evaluation and applying them to ourselves).
We revealed the specifics of the world of desires as one of the «other» worlds, which is based on the virtual indiscrete concept, which has no real reference in the outside world, but has two addressees: the outside world, on the one hand, and some possible world, on the other hand. Moreover, desires are one of the types of assessments and this way they are found outside of category of truth, but correlate with value assessments as special assessments about fragments of a possible, another world, positively valued and desired by the subject. The evaluation component is part of the structure of optative situation. We conclude that the object of desire can be only an unreal situation: the desire of the subject for something that he doesn’t have at the present moment, even if this is about preserving and maintaining the desired situation in the future. The question of the degree of controllability/uncontrollability of desire should not be considered resolved.